A Sprinkle of Stardust
CEO of the Denstone Group, Oliver Lovat takes a deep dive into The Stardust
Wayward Adventures At 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard.
In traditional storytelling structures, a four-act narrative arc begins with establishment, rising action, crisis, and resolution. Yet, in the case of 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard, home of The Stardust and Resorts World, within each act of this 70 year legacy are events, incidents and decisions that are so rich in color and controversy that they shaped the entire industry, providing both great benefits and disastrous costs for owners, investors and the reputation of the industry.
This history has garnered interest far outside the usual circles, but for those of us with an interest in management, operations and casino development, and the outcomes of both good and bad strategy in the hospitality environment, there is much to be learned by understanding the events at this iconic address.
Unconventional Origins
Tony “The Hat” Cornero Stralla arrived in Las Vegas direct from central casting.
The Cornero Stralla family was in the gambling business. His brothers opened The Meadows casino resort in Las Vegas in 1931 (Tony was in prison for bootlegging convictions) and on release he ran gambling ships, including the infamous SS Rex, off the Californian coast… until Federal agents ended that venture as the engineless ships were deemed a hazard to navigation. Moving to Nevada, he operated the SS Rex casino in Downtown Las Vegas… until his license was revoked.
After an assassination attempt in Los Angeles, he prepared to participate in the casino boom on the emerging “Strip”, with a resort fit for the new Atomic Age, situated at 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard.
Construction of The Stardust began in 1954, as Cornero hustled throughout the development process, failing to achieve licensure and juggling creditors, including Moe Dalitz, owner of the Desert Inn and pivotal figure in early Las Vegas. With increasing legal, financial and ownership challenges, and with the project delayed, Cornero suddenly died at Dalitz’ resort after playing dice, aged 55. Allegations persist that Cornero’s death was not of natural causes.
The history of the property’s origins offers important lessons. The Riviera, Dunes, Moulin Rouge, Desert Spa and Royal Nevada all entered bankruptcy in 1955, and although some subsequently had successful runs under different ownership groups, it sets a foundational lesson in casino development; timing is everything.
An interesting Las Vegas curio was that the original atomic age graphic logo was designed by Grace Silver, wife of Bill Silver, who had been brought to town by Cornero to drive the initial project forward. This was adapted as the marquee sign, designed by YESCO’s legendary artist Kermit Wayne, dominating the night sky, starting the fashion for increasingly ornate neon, and creating the importance of resort signage as an architectural differentiator.
Jeff Silver recalled, “With insufficient funds to complete the project, the (Cornero) Stralla family filed for bankruptcy. Tony had taken money from numerous smaller investors and my dad who was Tony’s vice-president, kept records of these investors as best he could, however it was difficult because being the former bookmaker that he was, Tony would accept cash and keep some of the investment records on pieces of paper he kept in his hat. It is certainly possible that at least some of the investor money was used by him for his “gambling entertainment.”
During the bankruptcy hearing my dad, who was represented by notable Las Vegas attorney, Louie Weiner, was in court to present evidence of these shareholders and secured creditors to the court. The evidence was contained in large boxes and a brief case that were brought into court. However, before the evidence could be introduced, the boxes and my dad’s brief case were removed by persons unknown during a lunch recess. Without the records the case went into freefall and the project was sold to mob-related insiders who ultimately completed the project.”
The beneficiaries were colorful couple Rella and John “Jake the Barber” Factor. Both immigrants with links to Chicago’s organized crime scene, and an impressive record of criminality and fraud on several continents, the Factors acquired the stalled project, completing the resort in July 1958, with Dalitz’s Desert Inn team running the operations.
The Stardust was notably different from other resorts on the Strip. In an early indicator of the importance of scale, rooms were set out in motel style blocks behind the casino, the property was the first to open with over 1,000 rooms. The question was, how could a Las Vegas hotel fill over 1000 rooms midweek? The introduction of the Convention Center in 1959 helped, boosting midweek occupancy.
Under the Factors, The Stardust focused on the middle-class market, developing a range of amenities for mass consumption, notably “The Big Dipper”, the largest pool in town, a drive-in movie theatre, and instead of established headliners rotating through the showroom, they imported Lido De Paris, a production show that played nightly. Guests could arrive by car or by Greyhound bus, with a terminal at the property, a popular method for less affluent visitors.
It incorporated the failed Royal Nevada resort shortly after.
As Act I closed, The Stardust had opened Las Vegas to a new customer, making it a popular, affordable destination. The decisions made by the entrepreneurial Factors shaped the programming tone and design characteristics for generations of casinos to come. The Stardust proved that scale was possible, with a clear demand for the Las Vegas experience outside the traditional gambling customers that the first generation of resorts had focused on, and moreover, it could be profitable to do so.
Rising, Skimming, Sinking
The Factors returned to California and strategy continued, increasing room count, restaurants and entertainment, continually adding elements to encourage repeat visitation and extending length of stay.
The Corporate Gaming Acts of the late 1960s allowed the early owners (several with unconventional backgrounds and financing methods) to exit Las Vegas casinos, with public companies leading the charge, with Howard Hughes providing many exits. Although he prized The Stardust, that acquisition was blocked.
Leading Las Vegas historian, Dr David Schwarz, identified The Stardust as “the mob’s longtime cash-cow” which may have been the deciding reason why the $40m sale to The Parvin-Dohrmann Corporation, a casino and gaming company with interests across Las Vegas, was agreed. After SEC investigations into that company, several assets were shifted to the unknown Argent Corporation in 1974, using a $62m Teamster loan as finance. The transaction caught the attention of Gaming Control Board Chairman, Phil Hannifin.
This period of The Stardust is told in Nicholas Pileggi’s book and movie adaptation, Casino, which centers on Chicagoan sports handicapper, Frank Rosenthal’s move to Las Vegas in 1968 to oversee gaming interests held by members of the Chicago outfit.
Under the effective control of Rosenthal, The Stardust remained popular, innovative and highly attractive, especially for gamblers, sports fans and those that loved entertainment – a formula that has endured for subsequent decades.
Keno was introduced to the Strip at the Stardust in the late 60s, and although first seen Downtown; Rosenthal built the first modern sportsbook on The Strip in 1975, bringing televised sports front and center of the Las Vegas casino experience. He was also enamored by illusionists Siegfried and Roy and incorporated the duo into the property entertainment program. Rosenthal famously filmed a TV show from the late 70’s, an early – and inadvertent- example of casino operators using media to communicate directly with potential customers (and the Gaming Control Board), showcasing aspects of the Stardust and interviewing his friends, including Frank Sinatra, Telly Savalas and O.J. Simpson.
It was the Sportsbook, however, that brought Rosenthal into the view of regulators.
In a large sports betting operation like the Stardust, it was not so obvious that out of state bets were being accepted in violation of the Federal Wire Act (interstate transmission of wagering information was a felony). It also allowed a proficient oddsmaker like Rosenthal to set the lines for illegal bookmakers across the country, sometimes benefiting himself and colleagues.
It was somewhat ironic that Rosenthal and The Stardust’s Icarus rise was curtailed by Jeff Silver, son of Bill and Grace Silver who had moved to Las Vegas to open the property under Cornero, who was charged to investigate Rosenthal’s suitability for licensing.
Silver shared the story. “Rosenthal approached Gaming Board Chairman Phil Hannifin who already had suspicions about Stardust putative owner (Argent CEO) Allen Glick, who, with no prior gaming experience, was able to obtain a Teamsters loan to acquire the property. Rosenthal offered to cooperate with Hannifin in providing information about Glick and others where it might be useful, with the hope that his licensing would be confined to a local investigation.
However, a former FBI agent who was working as a private investigator happened into my office asking questions about a minor case he was pursuing. After a brief exchange, he asked if he could help me with anything. I had just been appointed by the Governor in July 1975 and told him the only application in the office that had any “buzz” was Frank Rosenthal. The former agent replied, “you mean Lefty? I used to chase him around south Florida investigating illegal bookmaking. I have transcripts I will send you where he took the 5th amendment 37 times.”
After having reviewed the transcripts and seeing that none of this information was included in the draft summary of investigation, I called Hannifin… In January 1976 I used that information to recommend Rosenthal’s denial. That began a series of position changes, lawsuits and subsequent denials that confirmed Nevada’s regulatory authority. It was during these intervening years while Rosenthal was secretly operating Argent that widespread theft and slot skimming was uncovered by Chief of the Audit Division, Dennis Gomes.
During that time a person who had a friendship with Governor O’Callaghan and also had knowledge of some of these defalcations came to see me to reveal what he knew. Unfortunately for him, he was apparently tracked to my residence and after he left was never seen alive again. To date, his body has not been found.”
This investigation led to Argent selling the property to former Stardust Presidents Allan Sachs and Herb Tobman’s Trans-Sterling Corporation in 1979. Unlike Glick, the duo were experienced operators, and from appearance, managed the property firmly, insisting on standards, comfortable with managing an old-school gaming joint, which was appreciated by the gambling fraternity.
With many of the early properties sold and corporate investment dominating ownership, The Stardust lingered as the final, large Strip property with ties to organized crime. Yet, despite the protestations of owners Sachs and Tobman to the contrary, the skimming continued, as links were uncovered between Sachs and Dalitz.
The FBI continued to investigate Las Vegas, and the US Attorney’s wiretap of Kansas City mobsters caused a complaint to be filed against the Stardust. Schwartz writes, “when the FBI in 1982 released an affidavit detailing ongoing skimming, no one seemed surprised.”
The activity was so persistent and egregious, that in 1983 The Stardust was issued with a $4m fine, the principals had their gaming licenses suspended, and to avoid full closure, external operators were required to take over. A Strip casino had not faced such sanctions in years.
How much money was generated at The Stardust over the period will remain a mystery, however despite competition from The International/Hilton, MGM Grand, Circus Circus and Ceasars Palace, it remained both among the largest and most successful landmarks in the city.
As Act 2 ends, the curtain fell on a particular generation of players, as The Stardust became the poster child for nefarious activity in Las Vegas. Frank Rosenthal survived an assassination attempt and was placed in “The Black Book” excluding him from entering any Las Vegas casino. Sachs and Tobman, who owned interests in The Fremont and Sundance casinos in addition to The Stardust, vowed to clear their names.
Making Bank and Cashing Out
In the 1950s, Sam Boyd’s Stetson was as recognizable as Tony Cornero’s Fedora.
In the small world of Las Vegas casino management, it is likely the duo had encountered each other at The Sahara, where Boyd had become part-owner from 1952. Although Boyd was well known in town, he was certainly not considered one of the main guys, having remained away from the Mob controlled properties, operating Downtown and in locals’ joints for decades. There were no questions surrounding Boyd’s rectitude as an operator.
Sam, and his son Bill Boyd, were charged to run The Stardust and Fremont casino operations on behalf of the Gaming Control Board after the investigation in 1983. Trans-Sterling remained overall owners, as Sachs and Tobman fought their licensing appeals, (ultimately settling on a $3m fine “under duress”) with neither operating in gaming again.
Industry veteran Richard Schuetz was present on property at this time.
“I was at the ‘Dust for two years, and it was just a strain. When Nevada Gaming Control ran the top guys out, the store was still a bit curious. When things are curious at the top, it infects the whole store. It seemed there were about 15 independent businesses operating in the building, so to speak, and the store was unaccustomed to operating with a high level of character, honesty, and integrity. I was spending ridiculous hours in the building and was never comfortable with whom I could trust.
During this period, we were approached by the Boyd Group. They had acquired the Stardust from the “boys” and had moved a few of their people in to manage it. Prior to this, they had basically just run Sam’s Town, and they were very unfamiliar with the Strip.
When they took over the Stardust, the numbers started heading south, and then they decided to hire John Minor and me to help them understand what the Strip was about. They were kinda western-wear dudes, and we were dark-suited guys with cuff links.
It was kind of a weird marriage at Stardust in that John and I were told to run the store, but all the corporate folks for Boyd were officing in the Stardust, and it was a weird blend of different cultures.
The Boyds had a $500 limit on dice…ON THE STRIP! I immediately lifted that and was hit with arguments like “we don’t want a customer to build a lumber yard out of a toothpick,” and stuff like that.
I didn’t even know how to respond to that, other than looking at them in disbelief. It was just a shotgun wedding between two fundamentally different cultures…The Strip meets Dodge City. This cultural divide between some of the older Boyd folks and our approach to running the property just got too annoying, so I decided to leave.
What I learned at the Stardust is that when a store is well managed, it is pretty easy to run. When a store is poorly managed and has a long history as such, it is damn hard to run.”
Boyd’s operating style was more conservative, rooted in customer intimacy, rather than seeking the gaming action that the Stardust pursued under previous ownerships. As Las Vegas repositioned in the 1980s to a more value-driven destination for middle-America, (led by Jeff Silver, who was now President across the street at The Riviera) this strategy was a return to the property’s origins. Boyd added a 32-story tower, which opened in 1990. The room count was over 1,500.
Without the volatility (and illegality) at the casino, and with regular non-gaming revenues at scale, The Stardust provided solid profits, allowing the company to undertake a public listing in 1993. This gave Boyd Gaming the secure foundation and reputational advantage in the coming decade as it embarked on a national expansion to newly deregulated regional casino markets, employing a strategy more aligned to the company’s risk profile, rather than competing in the megaresort boom that was taking place elsewhere on The Strip.
By the mid-90s, the Stardust was generating over $140m in net revenue, around $40m in EBITDA, which was significant compared to the competitive set of historic properties, but compared to both the new Strip resorts, and even regional casinos, was relatively small.
Despite a solid reinvestment program, the property’s revenues continued to decline as the Strip market added significant new inventory and attractions, dismissing the notion that a rising tide raises all boats. Boyd had increased its footprint in the locals’ casino market, expanding Sam’s Town, acquiring Main Street Casino off Fremont Street, and latterly Coast Casinos. The company entered Atlantic City with the high-end Borgata, (in partnership with MGM-Mirage) opening in 2003, producing megaresort sized revenues.
In 2005, Borgata generated $735m of revenues and EBIT of $223m. By comparison, The Stardust’s EBIT that year was $25m.
One by one, the first generation properties were being imploded and replaced, with the Dunes, Aladdin, Sands and Desert Inn all gone, Boyd made the decision to close The Stardust, 49 years after opening, to be replaced by Echelon Place, a $4.8bn casino centered, mixed-use development, with 4 hotels and 5,300 rooms.
Of course, nothing is straightforward at 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard, and after implosion, Boyd halted the construction of the new resort only months into the project as the Great Recession took hold. Echoes of Tony Cornero and The Stardust were heard.
Throughout the portfolio, the company faced declining revenues, but unlike several of listed gaming operators, by terminating the development, Boyd avoided bankruptcy and the woes faced by others. Once again, as we know from the history of this site, timing is everything.
We end Act 3 with 88 acres of vacant land, punctuated only by the steel and concrete framing of an unbuilt casino resort, a collection of memories, and a series of valuable lessons.
Boyd had made the Stardust more profitable (legally, at least) than at any point in its history, but due to no fault of management, the competitive environment had changed both nationally and locally. Boyd had used the profits generated at The Stardust as the springboard for national expansion, diversifying the portfolio geographically, taking advantage of external conditions, and exporting their original business model nationally. In 2025, Boyd reported EBITDA of over $1.4bn.
However, since the Stardust’s implosion two decades ago, the company has not returned to the Las Vegas Strip, which has seen revenues nearly double from $13bn in 2005 to $25bn in 2025.
Access to the iconic Strip is highly prized globally, and global operator Genting eyed the site at 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard to make their market entry.
Redux?
The Lim Family are among the world’s leading gambling entrepreneurs. Their Genting Group is a multi-generational diversified conglomerate of businesses, with dozens of casinos, including a prized Singaporean presence. However, all their success had been outside Las Vegas.
When Resorts World opened in June 2021, facemasks were still mandatory. Considering Caesars, The Cosmopolitan and Venetian were each subject of multi-billion-dollar acquisitions, and work had restarted at The Fontainebleau, the stakes were high and customers expectant.
Early public renderings hinted at an Asian theme, with the resort designed by legendary architect Paul Steelman at a reported cost of $4.3bn. Celene Dion had been poached from Caesars Palace to play in the showroom, leading DJs signed for the Zouk Clubs, (imported from Singapore and owned by the Lim family) innovations in technology were being trialed throughout the property, new restaurant concepts were trailed, with an experienced team led by Scott Sibella, many of whom had moved from The MGM Grand, to ensure smooth progress and a successful opening.
The resort opened with three distinct hotel brands for different customer segments, united under the Resorts World headline, a tactic commonly seen in Cotai’s early years and in Genting’s other properties. Hilton, Conrad and Crockfords, named after the historic London casino acquired by the company, were nestled together in the main structure, separated by individual entrances.
Homage was paid to The Stardust, with artwork displaying the logo of the former resort scattered around the property, but on initial appearance, Resorts World was set to take an entirely different path to the former Las Vegas icon. Entertainment, art and technology were the tools, with the strategy, “Something for everyone, at scale, under one roof”.
As we know, Celine’s illness prevented her from commencing her residency, and with the Theatre outsourced to AEG, a full range of performing genres have featured, dictated by the promoter, not the operator. Various entertainment concepts and partners were introduced and dropped in rapid order. The food and beverage program has been hit and miss, with multiple outlets opening and closing in a relatively short period. The much-heralded cashless gaming system was quietly dropped, with broader marketing campaigns launched, pivoted, relaunched and ended, in rapid succession. The casino floor and design met a mixed reception, with the proximity to food court, DJ and live music caused a unique sound bleed, disorientating many slot players, diners and customers walking through the building. The retail component seems an architectural misfit to the broader design – the property did not hang well together compared to the high design standards across the city.
However, the most noteworthy element found in the short life of Resorts World has been the various investigations of wrongdoing at the casino, resulting in outcomes not seen since the days of Rosenthal, The Mob and The Stardust.
GCB and Federal investigations found Resorts World complicit in enabling – even encouraging – known “illegal bookmakers, felons, and individuals with ties to organized crime and money laundering” to regularly play at the property. Further investigation found Sibella central to the actions and decisions.
After a period where the future of Genting’s suitability to control operations was in doubt, the owners cleaned house, appointing former MGM CEO Jim Murren, former Governor Brian Sandoval and former GCB Chair A.G. Burnett to oversight positions, an act that almost certainly kept Genting licensable as a time when the company was seeking a highly desirable casino license for their New York racino.
The resort was handed a $10.5m fine, the largest for casino related misconduct in the State’s history and second largest overall, and Sibella’s license was suspended. Despite the apparent severity of the reprimand, many in the industry considered that the punishment and consequences for Genting could have been significantly worse.
Moreover, with such a “relatively” mild rebuke, Genting progressed with their New York licensing process and were subsequently awarded one of the three casino licenses; Resorts World New York City, will continue to perform as one of the highest grossing gaming floors in the country, now with table games.
Having narrowly avoided the curtain falling prematurely, it appears that Resorts World has fully reset, with Carlos Castro becoming the third property president in 5 years.
Without any doubt, challenges remain for the relative newcomer in the Las Vegas market.
Inside The Writers Room
Unlike the industry’s historians, such as Dave Schwartz or Michael Green, my interest in casino history is applied; how do we learn from the past decisions to meet current and future challenges. To this extent, both the formative decisions made at The Stardust and apparent disregard of contemporary strategic thinking at Resorts World, are of great interest.
The initial success of the Stardust was despite the highly irregular ownership and disjointed operating structure – which could have been terminal for other resorts – and enabled by the clear strategic position as set out by the Factors. It is unlikely that the property would have come close to the sustainable success if Cornero had seen the property to fruition.
The Stardust was clearly built for middle-class, aspirational Americans. This same strategy was replicated by Bill Bennett to success (at Circus Circus Enterprises), where the low-volatility casino environment, allied with focused amenities and programming for the target customers provided consistent and profitable performance.
Shifting customer profiles – but not strategy – under Rosenthal’s stewardship, the property focused on gamblers, many seeking the sports and entertainment programming and experiences set out by one of their own. Indeed, for many properties, this is the template that has been followed for many years.
If convention customers were the primary target, which is a legitimate segment based on the location, the resort would be entering the most competitive sector in the city, much of the marketing, programming and design are misaligned for that customer, particularly when considering the immediate competition.
Without identifying a clear customer focus, for any casino, it is impossible to meet customers’ needs and shape loyalty drivers.
Post the initial megaresort boom of the 1990s and national proliferation of gaming, supply gradually outstripped demand. To compete in Las Vegas, (and other concentrated areas such as Atlantic City) the imperative to segment and focus has grown more pronounced. The slow decline of The Stardust under Boyd is case in point, and that despite tight management controls, revenues and profits declined.
Moreover, when entering a competitive environment with a single asset, success can be achieved by identifying a demographic or psychographic segment where there is unmet demand, carving a unique position in the market allowing for competitive advantage.
Again, the original introduction of The Stardust to market highlights this, as does the success of Boyd’s Borgata to Atlantic City, Bellagio and Venetian to Las Vegas in the 1990s, and The Cosmopolitan in the 2010s.
As the Hard Rock re-enters Las Vegas, with the promise of gaming, music and rebellion, the brand alone has equity within the demographic, delineating customers along a series of profiles. The guitar-shaped tower is the architectural representation of this, (a modern-day Stardust sign) and it undoubted that the programming will align with the customer needs as communicated.
Without this strategic focus, all that is left is a tactical approach via programming, which may prove intermittently successful, is highly replicable and ultimately unsustainable.
Resorts World Las Vegas had the unique opportunity to launch post-Covid, and capture the zeitgeist, but alternatively launched separate tactical campaigns targeting Asian customers, foodies, partygoers, boomers, country music fans, experience-hungry Californians, conventioneers, over 60’s, and locals, all segments that have existing established, segmented properties that are holistically positioned to successfully capture loyalty for each.
It seems that marketing strategies were based around “what we have” rather than “meeting our customer needs”, a consequence of not defining the customer, the subsequent absence of strategy within the development phase, and failure to consider 75 years of applied marketing theory in the casino environment.
Most alarming, (other than the disregard of the considerable expertise that has been accumulated in researching this subject area) is that the exact strategy tried at Resorts World’s was played out at The MGM Grand, where over the past 15 years the once flagship resort promised “entertainment for everyone, at scale, under one roof”.
The outcome there was greatest decline in repeat visitation (failing to achieve loyalty, thus strategic failure) of any major Strip property during this period. It has left the leadership at MGM Resorts with a dilemma that may only be resolved with hundreds of millions of dollars in reinvestment and the introduction of a $2bn ballpark.
That Resorts World chose to identify this strategy is questionable, with those responsible either naive or negligent, and will prove a long-term problem for subsequent management.
Even taking Rosenthal’s established customer strategy (which some say is outdated, but has proved highly resilient) – gambling, sports, entertainment (with conventions midweek)– there was a unique opportunity present.
As the reduction in Federal gaming tax for sports bets in 1974 enabled Rosenthal to build the Stardust’s Sportsbook, the repeal of the Wire Act in 2018 opened sports betting engagement nationally. The competitive set, MGM and Caesars in particular, have invested heavily in engaging with sports bettors via online, with the hope of land-based engagement.
Even in traditional land-based Las Vegas properties, Circa, opening months before Resorts World, with the same architectural team, has proven that gambling and sports as entertainment is a highly effective draw in the programming mix. Nearly every other casino in the land has followed suit. In what should have been a home run considering the history of the address, Resorts World missed this boat at development phase, situating their “sportbar” in The Dawg House, doubling as a Country Music Bar (replete with grilled cheese sandwich food truck), adjacent to the Asian street food court, (with DJ at weekends), and opposite Crossroads vegan restaurant, which replaced the short-lived burger and lobster bar.
Completing The Story
As Boyd’s ownership wiped memories of past criminality associated with The Stardust, perhaps the latest management team at Resorts World will overcome the challenging initial opening years and find a customer to drive both property visitation and more importantly, loyalty.
The case studies for what’s next are present.
Notwithstanding the present lack of customer focus at property level, this could yet be determined with the introduction of a dominant infrastructure project, as seen with Sphere, Allegiant and T-Mobile and the impact to these arenas found at MGM’s properties.
With heavy lobbying to locate the arena of a future NBA franchise adjacent to the resort – as well as the convention center adjacency – the fortunes of Resorts World could still become a destination for functional needs of customers.
The transactional loyalty model, with a distributed database and rewards program, as implemented by Boyd and Caesars, is an option at corporate level, considering Las Vegas’ tax advantages for such a hub and spoke model for a national presence. With New York now offering table games, this is an option. Benefitting from the early start in New York, acquiring a competitor with scope for a more progressive footprint – and one already with a national presence – may be an option in the forthcoming M&A cycle.
We have seen in decades of narrative at The Stardust, and just five years at Resorts World, that adopting the correct strategy is key to operating a successful casino resort. Failure to manage in a strategic manner at planning stage will only rapidly erode competitive advantage and accelerate the demise of the opportunity. As Schuetz observed, when a resort is well managed, it is easy to run. It is unclear whether we are there yet at Resorts World, but some hope that a corner has been turned.
The rest of this story is still being written, but at 3000 South Las Vegas Boulevard, more drama is certain before the show is over.
Oliver Lovat is the CEO of the Denstone Group. He consults on development and the strategic positioning of casino resorts. He lectures and writes about the evolution of Las Vegas and Competitive Strategy.
